This paper studies the effect of a change in the marginal costs of advertising on advertising expenditures of firms and on consumer prices. I make use of a policy change in Austria, that involved an increase of the taxation of advertising in parts of the country, and a simultaneous decrease in other parts. I show that advertising expenditures of firms move quickly in the opposite direction to the marginal costs of advertising. Consumer prices increase with advertising in some industries, and decrease in others, depending on how informative or persuasive advertisements in different industries are. This is consistent with a new model of advertising that combines informative and persuasive forces.
Introduction
This paper studies the effect of a change of the marginal costs of advertising on advertising expenditures and consumer prices. It makes use of a policy change in Austria, which affected the marginal costs of advertising, and thus advertising expenditures. While previous works have estimated the impact of advertising on consumer prices for certain goods, this is the first study that investigates the effect of advertising costs on consumer prices for all major industries and representative data for an entire economy. As I show below, advertising increases consumer prices in some industries, and decreases them in others, depending on the information content in advertisings.
There are at least three important reasons why advertising has been of interest to economists:
First, advertising has been debated at length in the theoretical economic literature as it is closely tied to the issues of information and search, topics that have taken a prominent place in economic theory in recent decades. Advertising also features in models of entry barriers and product quality. Throughout its long debates advertising has remained a controversial topic, with contradicting policy recommendations, as discussed below. Detailed empirical evidence might be helpful to guide this debate.
Second, advertising itself is an increasingly important business activity. In the United States media advertising accounts for almost 2 percent of GDP, while in Europe typically for about half that number. 1 In Austria, on which this paper focuses, advertising accounted for a share of 0.009 of GDP in 2000. This was a substantial increase from the year 1990, where the share of advertising in GDP was only 0.0061 (see Grohall et al. 2007 ). Advertising is one of the main sources of revenue for the media industry and the internet but also for cultural and sporting events. Thus greater understanding of advertising is relevant for businesses in all these industries.
Third, the demonstration of the effects of taxation of advertising, which this study provides, meets a recurring policy idea, of which I mention only a few examples: While there are many cities and towns worldwide that tax local advertising, there have also been frequent attempts to introduce an advertising tax at state or national level. In 1987 the Florida legislature enacted a sales tax on a range of services that included advertising. In a heavy storm of protests the advertising tax was attacked as "unfair, unwise and unconstitutional" (Hellerstein 1988 2 Hence despite few actual observations of taxations of advertising at state or national level, it remains a recurring and important political subject, and an idea that is periodically discussed. Almost all countries have laws that ban advertising of certain products like cigarettes or health related products, bans which are likely to have effects similar to a substantial increase of an advertising tax.
For this investigation I make use of a policy change in Austria in 2000 that harmonized the regional taxation on advertising expenditure, thus simultaneously increasing it in some parts of the country while reducing it in others. A comparison of advertising expenditures of firms in these two parts shows a strong impact of the change in advertising costs on advertising expenditures, that is similar in magnitude across products from different industries. To investigate the change of consumer prices I complement this data on advertising expenditures with regional price indexes, and show that also consumer prices were immediately affected, but differently across industries.
The economic literature has distinguished informative and persuasive advertising, as described in greater detail below. Typically persuasive advertising is advertising which shifts demand outwards and/or decreases elasticities of substitution, which both serves to increase market prices. Informative advertising increases competition through improved information and thus reduces consumer prices. In this article I provide three contributions to this literature. First, I
show empirically a taxation of advertising has a strong effect on the advertising expenditure of firms. Second, I show that both effects, the informative and the persuasive effect of advertising, are present in some industries to a varying degree. This variation allows to classify industries by the different ways in which their advertising works. 3 Third, in the theoretical part I show that many existing theories of advertising are not consistent with the empirical observations.
However, I create a model by adding a persuasive element to an existing model of information that is consistent with the observations. If both forces (persuasion and information) are present in a single model, the effect of a cost reduction of advertising on consumer prices is not clear, and depends on which effect dominates. This model explains why an increase of the marginal cost of advertising causes prices to increase in industries with more informative advertising, and to decrease otherwise.
Throughout the debate advertising has remained a controversial topic: Some economists have argued that there are excessive amounts of advertising, which therefore may be a good target for taxation, while others have suggested that underprovision of advertising might provide a case for a subsidy. 4 The main cause of this different advice has been identified to be that advertising can be seen as persuasive or as informative (see Bagwell 2007) . Butters (1977) defines these two views as "advertising as a set of psychological ploys which induce consumers to buy products or brands that they otherwise would not buy", or as "a provision of information which allows consumers to make more discriminating choices within the framework of a fixed set of preferences." This distinction, however, goes further back at least to the work of Alfred Marshall (1919) who defined similar categories with the names of combative and constructive advertising. The persuasive view of advertising typically sees changes in preferences in the form 3 Ackerberg (2001) argues that advertising that provides product information can be distinguished, as it should only attract consumers that are inexperienced with the brand. This is however a different definition of informational advertising as used in the later described standard model, which solely concerns price information. 4 Some examples for these different viewpoints are among others: Pigou suggested a tax on advertising in 1929, in addition Dixit and Norman (1978) have argued for the possible presence of excessive amounts of advertising. Stivers and Tremblay (2005) present the case for a subsidy. Meurer and Stahl (1994) and Stegeman (1991) present models that can have both outcomes.
of an outward shift of demand, a decrease of elasticities of substitution between products, or increased monopoly power of firms, and thus increasing market prices, while the informative view sees increased information for consumers, stronger competition and thus lower market prices. A closely related distinction was brought forward by Johnson and Myatt (2006) , who call the two types of advertising hype and real information.
The persuasive view of advertising suggests that advertising shifts demand outwards. Its proponents have often called for a tax on advertising. A clear example is Kaldor (1950) who asserts a harmful effect of advertising and suggests the introduction of a tax on advertising. Further, Sutton (1974) makes the distinction between generated sales from advertising and diverting sales from advertising, where the described case would be encountered if there were only diverted and no generated sales. Finally, Gasmi et al. (1992) suggest that the advertising game between Pepsi and Coca Cola is a predatory competition that hardly serves to generate sales.
By the other view, advertising might serve as a transporter of information. This idea has been formalized in models closely linked to the large literature on consumer search, but rather than consumers searching for products, firms search for consumers via advertising. Here advertising provides useful information to consumers such as the existence, the quality, or the price of a good, see for example Butters (1977) , Stahl (1989) , or Grossman and Shapiro (1984) . In these models advertising expenditure has a marginal effect on a firm's demand that will correspond to the marginal advertising cost it faces. Therefore a change of the cost function will likely change advertising expenditure, and thus demand. It follows that in these models the taxation of advertising has in general a clear effect on firm variables: More advertising increases competition and thus lowers prices. As demonstrated by Stahl (1989) , in these models a subsidy for advertising might be desirable.
5
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data and empirical strategy used to estimate the effects of a change in marginal advertising costs on advertising expenditures and consumer prices, Section 3 presents the main empirical results, Section 4 shows that most 5 Grossman and Shapiro (1984) argue however that in the case of differentiated products advertising can lead to an inflation of the number of firms, which would not suggest the case for subsidy. current models of advertising are not consistent with the presented observations, and develops a model that is by combining the informative and persuasive views on advertising. Section 5 concludes.
Empirical strategy and data
The empirical investigation relies on a policy change of the tax on advertising in Austria in 2000. Austria is one of the few countries in the world, and the only OECD country that collects a nationwide tax on advertising. The tax is officially called 'Werbeabgabe', and locally referred to as 'Werbesteuer'. It covers advertising for goods and services from all industries. A constant fraction of advertising expenditure that a firm pays to the media has to be paid by the advertising firm to the authorities as advertising tax. There are only few companies or publications that are exempt from paying the tax, such as advertising expenditure for content in student run school magazines or the advertising of churches and benevolent non-profit organizations.
The tax includes all television and radio spots, advertisements in newspapers and magazines, and expenditure for all other publicly displayed advertisements (for more details see Grohall et al. 2007 ).
The advertising tax was introduced in 1927, and has remained in place ever since without interruption. Until the year 2000 it was collected at regional level with different tax systems in different regions, whereby the location of the publication in which the advertising appears determines the payable tax. The states Tirol and Burgenland 6 did not collect any advertising tax. The amount payable in the other provinces was typically ten percent of advertising expenditure. In the state of Salzburg the tax was only collected in the city of Salzburg, and the state Vorarlberg had a tax of only five percent (see Bundesgesetzblatt 2000 and VÖZ 1995) . At the national level, at which the large majority of firms operate and most advertisements are made, the tax was ten percent. local authority may only tax the advertising value generated on its territory, even in the case of radio stations. As apparent from the minutes, this decision made the collection of the tax practically impossible. In turn parliament felt that the law had to be adjusted. None of these reasons suggests that the timing of the harmonization was chosen in a way that would benefit a particular state. Before the harmonization there was a recurring demand from the chamber of commerce and some journalists to abolish the tax altogether, but no political party or rep- This dataset does not include all publications available in Austria, but with over 400 news providers all major ones and a wide range of small local magazines. Table 1 reports by state 7 Source of regional GDP data: Statistik Austria online database.
the number of regional advertisements recorded, the number of regional media (typically local newspapers, here only shown if they are exclusive to one state), the log average cost of an advertisement and the number of firms advertising in each of these mediums. In total, the dataset contains about 700,000 advertisements for the period considered. Table 1 Typically I estimate a differences-in-differences equation of the following type:
In this equation, P ost is a variable that takes a value of one for the year of 2003 and a value of zero in the year 1997, T reat is a dummy variable that indicates the firms advertising in the states of Tirol and Burgenland, and the interaction P ost × T reat gives the differencesin-differences coefficient of interest. In the regressions robust standard errors are clustered by state. Although the used data is a panel with many time dimensions, I typically focus on the year three years before and the year three years after the treatment (the years 1997 and 2003)
to avoid correlation of errors in the regression, which is a concern in differences-in-differences estimations with repeated time periods (see Bertrand et al. 2004 ). Some robustness checks with more complete panels and other years are provided.
Results

Effect on advertising expenditures
First I analyze how the growth rate of advertising expenditures reacted to the introduction of the tax. Given that the treatment differs at state level, I only use local advertisers, defined as firms that advertise in one state only. Since most advertising in Austria is at the national level or across more than one state, this restriction reduces the number of observations in the dataset to less than ten percent. In addition I only use firms that have positive advertising expenditures in all eleven years of the panel from 1995 to 2005 to obtain a balanced panel.
The resulting dataset consists of 877 observations in the provinces of Tirol and Burgenland and 1,120 in the other provinces, and includes a complete panel of total advertising expenditure for each of these firms and each year. The data reports the expenditures as they arrive at the publications, and thus reports the expenditure net of taxes.
In order to normalize advertising expenditures I compute the growth rates of advertising expenditure for each of the remaining firms. Figure 2 shows the mean growth rates of advertising expenditure for the two subsamples of Tirol and Burgenland where the tax increased and other states where the tax decreased, and the 95 percent confidence intervals of these mean growth rates. These are estimated using information on the coefficents from a regression of advertising expenditure on year fixed effects using robust standard errors clustered by industry. To limit the influence of outliers, the one percent highest and lowest growth are excluded from the graph. To see how the effect differs across industries I provide estimates from a differences-in-differences regression as described in equation 1 in the upper part of Table 3 There is evidence for a significant reduction of advertising expenditures in Tirol and Burgenland 8 Tirol and Burgenland experienced a five percent increase of costs from one to 1.05, and the other states a decrease of 4.5 percent from 1.1 to 1.05.
for some industries. All coefficients that differ significantly from zero at a ten percent level of significance show a negative coefficient in the differential coefficient, and also the overall mean effect is negative and significantly different from zero. Using this sample I estimate in OLS a differences-in-differences regression using again robust standard errors, and in this exercise firm fixed effects. The results are reported in the second part of Table 3 . There is stronger evidence for a reduction of advertising expenditures in Tirol within firms overall, and for all industries except tourism, coefficients do not vary strongly across industries.
In addition I verify if these expenditures correlate with advertising intensity of industries, but find no evidence for such a correlation. The number of newspapers in which firms decide to advertise did not declined significantly with the advertising tax and remained very stable in treatment and control states alike. In states with an increase of the tax the mean number of newspapers per firm changed from 2.9 to 2.6 between 1995 and 2005, while in states with a tax increase the mean number changed from 2.3 to 2.2. I did not find a differential effect for any of the years in between.
Taken together, these results suggest that the increase of advertising costs indeed caused a decrease of advertising expenditures across almost all industries, and to the opposite effect in no industry. As discussed below, many of the views on advertising described in the literature section of this article would not predict such an adjustment of expenditures. The within-firm results give similar coefficients for different industries, and suggest that the reallocation is of similar magnitude in different industries.
Prices
In the literature there exists some evidence of how advertising effects prices. In particular, several studies make use of bans of advertising in certain areas for certain goods. They found that advertising seems to decrease prices for eyeglasses (Kwoka 1984 ), children's breakfast cereal 9 This is the first study that provides such elasticities for all industries and the complete universe of goods.
Again the estimation follows the common differences-in-differences approach, following equation Table 4 reports the estimates for all COICOP class 1 industries, except communication which does not vary at state level.
To increase the number of observations I use the most disaggregated level for which I can access price information, which goes down to COICOP class 3 level, so that sub categories for industries are used. In these regressions I apply state fixed effects and cluster robust standard errors by state. This table confirms what is observable in graph 3: There is evidence that prices increased in the industries food and education, while they decreased for alcohol and tobacco, transport, hotels and restaurants.
The overall effect is estimated in Table 5 . Again these estimates suggest an increase of prices in Prices at industry level, which are aggregations, may be too broad to cover the true effects.
Statistics Austria generally does not give access to its data on prices of individual goods, but they agreed to provide me with a small random sample to perform a robustness check. I asked for prices are that are comparable across states, from products that may be sold by small local businesses. They provided me with 40 such prices at the most disaggregated available level. Examples of these units that they supplied are beefsteak in a restaurant, an hour of a car mechanic or a car wash. Some of these panel series are incomplete, with missing states or missing years. I drop these products, and in Table 6 I reproduce the same regressions as on industry level using these detailed prices. As is apparent, the tables give the same signs as prices at industry level on the differential effect. However, the number of observations is lower, which sometimes may be the reason for lower statistical significance. This robustness check gives some evidence that the aggregate price indices behave similar to the goods that they consist of in this exercise.
Persuasive and informative advertising industries
The observed differences of the behavior of consumer prices across industries points to possible differences of the parameters across industries. Consumers may be more easily persuaded to buy certain products such as alcohol and tobacco than to buy certain food. In an industry with parameters such that persuasion is costly, advertising content focuses on the informative aspect of advertising, while industries with persuasive potential will make efforts to put additional elements into their advertisings.
As discussed in the introduction and as illustrated in the model section below, the model predicts a positive relationship between industries in which advertising leads to a price increase, and the persuasive content of advertising. To test this prediction I rely on a study from the marketing literature that provides a meta-analysis of the information intensity in advertisings from different industries (Abernethy and Franke 1996, Table 2 ). In their article they summarize the findings from 60 studies that measure information content of advertising. Table 4 and the information content reported by this meta-study. The correlation between the two series is 74 percent, a regression with robust standard errors yields a slope that is significantly different from zero at five percent level of confidence. The slope coefficient of the displayed line is 0.02 with a robust standard error of 0.0077. This suggests that the informative effect of advertising is observed in industries with high information content in advertising.
Summary and magnitudes
These results show a significant relative reduction of advertising expenditures or a more frequent exit from advertising markets in the states of Tirol and Burgenland after they experienced a relative increase of the overall advertising tax and for the large majority of industries. Further, the results highlight a within-firm reallocation of advertising expenditure out of Tirol. While the advertising expenditures react consistently across industries, consumer prices increase for some and decrease for other industries. In particular, there is evidence that prices increased in the industries food, transportation, education and tourism while they decrease for alcohol and tobacco, health, leisure and house and garden.
The weighted differential growth rates from Table 4 suggest that mean prices in Tirol were about 1 percent higher than in the other states after the introduction of the tax. This suggests that the 9.5 percent difference in marginal advertising costs, or the 25.5 percent difference of advertising expenditures arriving at media, or the 16 percent difference of firm expenditures on advertising resulted in a one percent difference of consumer prices. Note that this mean price is an average of positive and negative growth rates. The effects for certain industries or products can be much higher or lower as apparent from Table 4 .
Implications for theory
Many existing models of advertising are not consistent with these findings. In this section I review some of the existing models in light of the empirical findings. I then modify an existing model to arrive at a new model that is consistent with the empirical results.
In the literature there is a class of models of advertising based on the view that advertising expenditure itself may serve as a quality signal. This idea was developed by Nelson (1970 Nelson ( , 1974 Nelson ( , 1978 and later formalized by Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986).
In these models advertising expenditure can serve as a costly signal for quality that can lead to a separating equilibrium of high and low quality firms. By this account, the content or form of advertising is irrelevant. Milgrom and Roberts write: "this type of advertising corresponds to a public burning of money". This type of model is in contradiction one of the key findings of this paper, the finding that marginal advertising costs influence advertising expenditure. If advertising is equal to public burning of money, the optimal amount of advertising expenditure would remain the same if as a consequence of a tax part of the money is submitted to the government rather than to the flames. This holds true as long as the public is aware of that tax.
Another view of adverting, which can be seen as an extreme example of the persuasive effect of The information models of informative advertising (see for example Stahl 1994) typically predict that advertising expenditure decreases with the marginal cost of advertising. However, since they only consider the informative aspect of advertising, they predict that advertising lowers consumer prices. Thus the models can not predict the finding that advertising increases in some industries with low information content in advertising. In these models, a subsidy for advertising would increase welfare.
As shown below, if I extend such a model by a persuasive element I arrive at a model that has both effects, the informative and the persuasive effect of advertising, which is consistent with all the findings from the data. The extension of an informative model with persuasion also addresses another important aspect of these models. In these models advertising solely serves to inform consumers of market prices. In practice however advertising contains much more than just price information. If a persuasive element is added to the model, this criticism is also addressed.
Consider a market with n ≥ 2 firms that produce a good that for the same level of advertising is a perfect substitute with production costs equal to zero. Firms compete by simultaneously choosing prices p i and advertising expenditures a i for firm i, taking the behavior from the other firms as given. The measure of advertising expenditure a i denotes the probability that a given consumer will receive an advertisement of firm i. Therefore by definition 0 ≤ a i ≤ 1.
Firms do not know how many advertisements from competitors reach a consumer, thus each consumer has the same probability to receive an advertisement from firm i. The costs of advertising level a i are given by the cost function c(a i ), which is assumed to be positive for all values a i > 0 and monotonically increasing in a i . Further I assume that lim a→0 c (a) = 0 and lim a→1 c (a) = ∞ to ensure uniqueness. This assumption plausibly requires that it is nearly costless to inform a very small number of consumers, but very costly to reach every single consumer with advertising.
On the demand side of the market, there is a mass of consumers who wish to purchase one unit of the good at most. The mass of consumers is normalized to one without loss of generality.
Consumers receive advertisements which indicate the price at which the advertising firm sells the product. A consumer who does not receive an advertisement does not buy the product, consumers who receive more or equal to one advertisement buy at the lowest price they observe, given this price is below their marginal willingness to pay. This is the information component of advertising as developed by Butters (1977) .
To introduce the persuasive element of advertising I built upon the work of Stigler and Becker (1977) who propose to model persuasive advertising by making a distinction between the price as firms see it and the price as it appears to households. 12 If firm i charges price p i for the good and advertises with advertising intensity a i , consumers will respond to this price subjectively as if it was ρ i = p i /g(a i ), where ρ i is the subjective price as it appears to the household in question and g(a i ) is a monotonically increasing function of the advertising intensity of firm i.
The function g(a) maps non-negative advertising expenditures into linear transformations of 12 Among others, Becker and Murphy (1993) argue that persuasive advertising may serve to shift demand.
prices. Further I assume that the first derivative g (a) is strictly greater than zero, such that an increase of advertising expenditure makes the subjective price appear smaller to the persuaded consumers. Thus advertising makes consumers more willing to buy the product at a certain price.
It should be noted that in the model derived such an increase of g(a i ) can be interpreted as a higher willingness to pay for the good by a given number of consumers, but also such that the number of potential consumers increases with an increase of a i . In these models both these views are possible, since in practice a higher level of advertising for a given price leads to an increased demand for the advertised good.
The maximum willingness to pay for each consumer is assumed to be equal to a subjective price of v. If consumers receives no advertisement, or only advertisements suggesting prices ρ > v they do not buy the product. If they receive at least one advertisement that suggests a subjective price ρ smaller or equal to v they buy from the firm with the lowest price.
A similar envelope theorem argument as developed by Stahl (1994) can be applied in the present case to show that in the situation analyzed in equilibrium, the optimal advertising expenditure of a firm will be independent of the consumer price it charges. 13 The convexity assumptions concerning costs ensure that for a firm a unique optimal level of advertising expenditure exists.
14 This level is similar for all other firms, since they are ex ante identical. I will denote the constant equilibrium advertising expenditure of firms by a. Apart from this ex-ante proposition on the constancy of advertising expenditures, it can be verified ex post that firms do not have an incentive to change their advertising levels if all the other firms advertise the amount a.
Equilibrium profits in equation 4 denote the profits for a firm given that all its rivals use advertising amount a and prices from the equilibrium distribution. Since this equation is independent of prices, this equation is maximized with respect to a i by firm i, and hence firm 13 In particular, if the profit function is expressed in terms of ρ instead of p, its form is a special case of the general form analyzed by Stahl. Some empirical evidence on this finding was presented by Caves and Greene (1999) who found that advertising does not serve as an indicator of quality.
14 Note from equation 2 that maximization with respect to a i gives the equilibrium condition that marginal costs of advertising equal a constant.
i will also choose the equilibrium level a of advertising. The equilibrium price distribution is denoted with F (p) which indicates the probability that a firm charges a price lower than p.
The number of goods that firm i can expect to sell is in the case of two firms given by the demand F (p i )) ], in Nash equilibrium it must hold that a i = a (provided a unique solution for a exists). The terms of this demand function count the consumers that receive advertising from firm i (by definition this is equal to a i ) and not from the rival (1 − a) plus those consumers that receive advertising from both firms, provided that the price of firm i is lower. In the case of n firms this demand can be generalized and is characterized by the
n−1 . Then expected profits of firm i, denoted by E(Π i ) are given by:
At any point of the equilibrium price distribution of consumer prices the expected profits must be the same. In equilibrium the upper bound of the price distribution is the marginal willingness of consumers to pay vg(a) (see Varian 1980) . The price distribution must be continuous since any breakpoint could be profitably undercut. At a price at the upper bound of the distribution the probability of another price being lower F (p) must be one. Expected equilibrium profits at this point can be derived straight forwardly and are given in equation 4.
The equilibrium price distribution F (p) is then derived from equating the profit function of the upper bound with expected profits. Equating profits at the upper bound of the price distribution with expected profits while setting F (p i ) = 0 (since at the lower bound prices can't be undercut) yields the lower bound of the equilibrium price distribution. Thus the equilibrium price distribution is given by:
The expected equilibrium profits of each firm are:
Given symmetry, in equilibrium it holds that a i = a. The main difference with respect to the model of Butters (1977) and Stahl (1994) 
Consider the introduction of an advertising tax which transforms the cost function of firms from c(a) to c(a t )(1 + t), where a t denotes advertising expenditures under taxation. The advertising tax considered in the empirical analysis in this paper works in a similar fashion, since it is calculated as a constant share of all advertising expenditure of a firm.
• Proposition 1: In equilibrium ∂a/∂t < 0. The introduction of a proportional tax on advertising expenditure decreases advertising expenditure. See appendix 1 for a proof.
Proposition 1 holds in the extended model that includes the persuasive g(a) term, but it is also observed in previous models which do not incorporate a persuasive element. A difference between these models emerges however when prices are considered:
• Proposition 2: In equilibrium ∂p/∂a may be positive or negative depending on the parameters and the location on the price distribution. Advertising will increase market prices in industries where persuasive forces dominate, and decrease them where informative forces dominate. While the upper end of the price distribution increases with an increase of the equilibrium advertising expenditure a, the lower end of the price distribution and the expected value of prices may increase or decrease.
Proof: First consider the model that does not have the persuasive element represented by the g(a) term. In this version the derivative of the price distribution with respect to a is given by:
Since in this model v is the maximum willingness to pay and hence the maximum observed consumer price, it will hold that p ≤ v. The derivative above must be greater or equal to zero. F (p) denotes the probability to observe a price lower than p, hence if F (p) increases for a given value of p, this suggests a decrease of prices. Higher advertising expenditure increases competition and thus decreases prices in this purely informational model. In the model extended by g(a) however the partial derivative becomes:
The term (vg(a)/p) Note that at the upper bound of the price distribution where p = vg(a) this partial derivative is negative. Hence the upper bound of the price distribution increases with higher advertising expenditures for all parameters of the model. This is due to the persuasive element that increases the maximum willingness of consumers to pay with advertising.
Prices at the lower bound of the price distribution where p = (1 − a) n−1 vg(a) will increase if (n − 1)g(a) < g (a)(1 − a), and decrease or remain the same otherwise. Hence at the lower bound prices are more likely to decrease for a large number of firms n, or a small opportunity to persuade consumers (small g (a) ). In these markets the price distribution widens with ad-
vertising. An example of a price distribution in this case is demonstrated in figure 6 , which
shows price distributions for simulated data with varying equilibrium advertising expenditures.
Markets are parametrically possible where all prices increase (in the sense that the values on the cumulative density function of prices becomes less or equal at all feasible prices).
From equation 5 follows that the expected value of prices will increase in the equilibrium advertising expenditure a if and only if:
For a level of advertising expenditure close to zero this inequality will not hold, and an increase of advertising expenditure will decrease the expected value of prices. Note that even in the case of a large number of firms the expected value of prices may increase or decrease; given a large number of firms it will increase if
This suggests that in markets with a large number of competitors and either very low or very high initial equilibrium levels of advertising, an increase of advertising expenditures decreases 
Conclusion
A policy which involved a change of the taxation of advertising is used to estimate across industries how advertising costs affect advertising expenditure and consumer prices. The data suggests that the proportional taxation of advertising expenditure is an effective policy to reduce advertising; I estimate that a one percent increase of the marginal tax of advertising decreases advertising expenditure by 1.6 percent, and there is significant evidence of reduction across all industries.
On the basis of a theoretical model I show that in principle prices may increase or decrease with advertising, depending on whether persuasive or informative forces dominate in an industry.
The estimation results suggest that informative forces, which decrease prices with advertising, dominate in the industries food and education; while persuasive forces that increase consumer prices with advertising seem to dominate in the industries of alcohol and tobacco, transportation, hotels and restaurants.
Thus there is a case to restrict advertising in these latter industries -and in fact many countries already restrict advertisements for alcohol and tobacco. As shown, a proportional tax on advertising expenditure is a useful policy tool to achieve that goal. Overall however, the informative forces seem to dominate. I estimate that a ten percent increase of advertising tax leads to a 0.5 percent increase across consumer prices. Thus a complete abolition of the five percent advertising tax in Austria would lead to an overall increase in competition and lower consumer prices by about 0.25 percentage points. This effect however would differ across industries as described.
Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1:
For a single firm it is straight forward to show that given the advertising expenditures of its competitors an increase of advertising costs decreases its advertising expenditures. This is less trivial for the equilibrium a in Nash equilibrium. Note first that if a solution to the optimal amount of advertising exists, it can't be the boundary solution of a = 1, since from equation 4 all firms would make losses at this level of a. Thus if an equilibrium solution with a > 0 exists, it must be an interior solution, and fulfill the following first and second order equilibrium conditions:
The term (1 + t) on the right hand side denotes the tax on advertising. Let us consider the introduction of a marginal tax on advertising, an increase of t from 0 to . Rewriting the first order condition:
Before the introduction of the tax, the numerator and denominator on the left hand side have the same value. Proposition 1 states that a decrease of a would increase the left hand side to make the equation hold in the new equilibrium for an increased right hand side. To show is that in equilibrium the partial derivative of the left hand side of the equation above with respect to a is smaller than zero. This condition to be proven is:
From the first order condition, and given that we analyze the case where t is shifted from 0 to close to zero, follows that c (a) = v(1 − a t ) n−1 (a t g(a t )) in the neighborhood of t = 0. This simplifies the condition above to:
The term (1 − a) n−1 (ag(a)) v must be smaller or equal to c (a) by the second order condition.
The term −(n − 1)(1 − a) n−2 (ag(a)) v is less than zero since all its components are positive.
Thus the equation above must hold for all feasible equilibria, the left hand side decreases in a, thus a decrease in a is needed to balance the increase of taxes on the right hand side, and hence an increase of the marginal costs of advertising decreases the equilibrium advertising expenditure.
Appendix 2
In this appendix I provide details on the match of industries in the COICOP classification from the Statistics Austria with the industries from Abernethy and Franke (1996) , Table 2 Table 2 on page 10. Table  4 against information content of advertising in industries as reported in the meta study by Abernathy and Franke (1996) and a linear trend computed using OLS. 
